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THOUGHTS ON LEGAL EDUCATION
KENNETH K.

LUCE*

An interesting article appeared recently in the September issue of
the American Bar Association Journal, written by the Honorable Arthur T. Vanderbilt, and entitled: "The Law School in a Changing
Society: A Law Center." The article is critical in approach, and
perhaps Mr. Vanderbilt has deliberately over-stated his case, but the
reader is left with the general impression that, in the opinion of the
author, the average American law school today has made little effort
to meet, and is largely unaware of the problems of legal education
in this developing society. Numerous recommendations are suggested
for change in and addition to modern law school curricula and activities, and they are of such nature that hardly anyone could find
reason to oppose the proposals made viewed generally and in the
abstract. The fighting issue which emerges from any effort to place
such proposals into practical operation is one of emphasis. The problem of emphasis is not insoluble. The article in question does not
pretend to deal with it, and it is the purpose of this paper to outline
some aspects of the problem in the light of the suggestions Mr. Vanderbilt has made.
It is suggested that the law schools enter more actively than they
have into the field of legal education for the graduate lawyer. The
latter may find himself lacking in technical knowledge required for
tax work, or in certain corners of the administrative law. Legal problems may be considered in the light of general public interest through
discussion in institutes, and in conferences among lawyers, judges,
educators and business men sponsored by the law schools. Beyond
question the law schools should enter into this work in cooperation
with the Bar Associations and other groups, and in varying degree
many of them already have done so. But here there is only one
answer to the problem of emphasis. The law school must expand
its activity absolutely. There must be no cutting into, no sacrifice of
the training given to the undergraduate law student, and no shift in
emphasis by the faculty from the continual improvement of that training to unrelated activity. The law school dean or professor who is
forever attending conferences, conventions and institutes soon crosses
the line where his school, his classes, and his students begin to suffer.
The article states:'
"Again, most members of the Bar scorn the criminal law
as beneath their dignity (excepting, perhaps, anti-trust suits),
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.

'Vanderbilt, "The Law School in a Changing Society: A Law Center," 32 Am.
Bar Ass'n. Journal 525 (1946).
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an attitude quite incomprehensible to English lawyers, for their
leaders often excel in such practice. But how many law schools
pay more than lip service to criminal law in an attenuated first
year course in the subject?"
The writer is inclined to question whether the very considerable
number of American lawyers who practice outside the larger cities
"scorn the criminal law as beneath their dignity", except for the lucrative anti-trust suit, or whether a leader of the English Bar would
excel in the criminal practice over a leader of the Bar in an average
American community of ten thousand people. And assuming such
aversion to the criminal practice to exist, query whether the law
schools are responsible. The writer graduated from one mid-western
law school, and is teaching in another, and can testify that disrespect
for the criminal practice and supine willingness to accept its defects
as they are do not prevail as the general attitude of faculty and student
in either. It is true that the average law school devotes one course
to criminal law as such, but the shadow of the criminal penalty is
cast in every other subject in the curriculum, and is frequently noted
if the course is properly taught. And if the one course in criminal
law is increased to two or three, the problem of emphasis raises its
ugly head.
It is suggested that increased attention be devoted to a long list
of subjects including administrative law, foreign relations, world organization, international law, the civil law and comparative law generally, government and public law, and apparently it is felt that the
study of law in the schools of today amounts to little more than a
discussion of technical rules. All law schools known to the writer
include in the curriculum courses in administrative law, municipal law;
and constitutional law covers a broad range and is not slighted. Many
of them include courses in legislation and international law. And regardless of the name of a course it appears obvious that whether it
is presented as a collection of technical rules in a vacuum, or as a
body of living law in a background of human relationship wherever
it may extend today, must depend very largely upon the approach
of the individual teacher in the class room. Statistics and general conclusions cannot paint a correct picture of the condition of our law
schools in this respect. The writer feels certain that the condition is
far from deplorable, and is progressing in the right direction.
Perhaps the law schools should increase the length of the course
from three to four years.2 But if any detailed attention is to be given
to any considerable number of the suhjects suggested and activities
indicated by Mr. Vanderbilt; if they are to be placed in the curriculum
2Mechem, "The Proposed Four-Year Law Curriculum: A Dissenting Opinion,"

38 Mich. L. R. 945 (1940).
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as courses with distinct recognition; then the law school course must
be increased beyond four years to five or six, or some of the courses
now considered basic, such as contracts, torts, agency, corporation
law, criminal law and procedure, and evidence must be curtailed or
eliminated altogether. Of course such alternatives are nonsense. There
are already so many courses that the student cannot take them all
in the three years allotted him, so why add more? You cannot make
a social minded being, an effective political reformer, or an internationally minded thinker of a student, by adding more courses to
those already offered, all on the theory apparently that the courses
now offered teach him nothing and make him anti-social. The course
system is nothing more than an expedient concession to method in
the first place, designed to avoid the haphazardness of just reading
law. With this in mind it should be clear that there should be no
more courses in the curriculum than the student can take in three
years, and these should contain all the law, philosophy, foreign relations and what have you that the school can offer to train the man
for a career in which he can make a living and find a useful and
constructive place in the legal profession. 3 The content of the courses
presents a problem in method and emphasis, but the much needed
reform must come within this limited number of courses, and since
it is a lawyer who is being trained the writer sees no reason not to
call the courses contracts, torts, evidence, criminal law and procedure,
and agency. The system of courses now generally in operation has
grown like Topsy since the early years of this century, and is too
long, but it is no solution to pile on more courses with each social
upheaval, each war, and each technological advance.
The possibilities of reform toward an integrated body of courses
are unlimited. The case system is under attack because of its failure
in its pure form to provide the student with the historical and informational background necessary to a proper understanding of the
problems. Professor Llewellyn cites the illustrative and amusing example of the student who can juggle the principles of Bills and Notes
with the mental dexterity of an Einstein, but who has never seen
a bill. 4 The requirements, or lack thereof, for pre-legal education are
under fire, and it is pointed out that the law schools themselves have
done next to nothing about it. Law teachers are puzzled and exasperated because college graduates seem unable to read or write the
English language. Can the school give to the student a proficiency
3This might be subject to a very few. exceptions: namely patent law and perhaps
admiralty, where the technical and informational background departs more
4 radically from that normally possessed by the lawyer.
Llewellyn, "On What Is Wrong With So-Called Legal Education," 35 Col L.
R. 651 (1935), at page 669.
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in modem administrative and governmental problems, and a broad
social outlook by adding courses to the curriculum with new names?
Our reform of the educational process must begin before that, and
differently. Must there be a new course for the background and history and social implications of the labor movement, or can the case
system be adapted to present some of this in connection with, say,
the injunction, in a course already contained in the curriculum and
called Equity, or Contracts? Of course the concepts underlying the
after acquired property clause in a corporate mortgage and the doctrine of potential possession are meaningless without their business
background and historical development, but is there any objection to
doing it all in Sales? The ideal should be the graduate who is a
lawyer and a gentleman, who, incidentally, can read, write and speak
English. This business of reform in the educational system is a big
order, and the writer feels much more optimistic about the prospective
graduate if the family and home have produced a gentleman who has
learned to write and speak English upon enrollment in law school.
For if he is not a gentleman then, will he ever be the kind of public
minded lawyer both the writer and Mr. Vanderbilt are talking about,
regardless of technical training in the law obtained usually after attaining the age of maturity?
Justice Holmes stated in one of his opinions :"General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The
decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle
than any articulate major premise."
There is the crux of the situation. It is so easy to err in adjusting
the emphasis in technical and informational training between practice
in the courts, practice before a myriad of administrative tribunals,
or the drafting of legislation. But if the judgment and intuition referred to by Holmes are developed sufficiently, the errors are much
less likely to prove fatal. And development of this judgment and
intuition must and can proceed in every course offered, regardless of
specific content or name. Furthermore it would seem apparent that
such judgment can arise only from some philosophy about law, developed in the process of orderly and disciplined thinking as distinguished from vague and haphazard speculation at close range
upon ever shifting external phenomena in social and economic life.
There are those who believe it might help to return the high school
and college student to some of the menial discipline found in ancient
5 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 at 76 (1905).
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languages and pure mathematics., Those of us who adhere to natural
law feel there are some enduring beacon lights requiring changes of
course when the currents of a time point the positive law in the direction of the rocks. Justice Holmes professed to be a skeptic, 7 but the
judgment or intuition which he possessed and to which he referred
were things subtle and inarticulate, and obviously not the result alone
of technical skill or cleverness.
Courses in Legislation and Statutes are urged. Can any one think
of more productive laboratories for the study of legislation in action
than the bearded courses in negotiable instruments, sales, corporations,
and constitutional law? If we can't get it across to the student there,
we never will by adding courses and changing names. If the process
requires inroads upon the case system to furnish time for drafting
exercise and the like, it certainly can be done. All of the fine work
produced by the American Law Institute and the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws is available and waiting. But again the caveat
- what is the technically skilled legislative draftsman without a philosophy and a judgment or intuition to do but dash hither and yon
upon the current and mayhap in a fog? How is he to know that the
so-called administrative organism he is defining may not fit into the
right legal scheme because of the possibility of development along
authoritarian lines? If the men who control it do know, then it will
be made to fit even though the conditions which gave it birth required
changes in legal machinery. The rocks are always there, and do
not move.

6

Pound, "A Generation of Law Teaching." 38 Mich. L. R. 16 (1939), where the
author states at pages 24-25: "Yet looking back over forty years of teaching
(for I began law teaching in 1899), I seem to see certain effects of college
teaching of the social sciences to students with no training in logic or in
languages requiring accurate attention to accidence, grammar and context. I
seem to feel an increasing difficulty in teaching the technique of legal reasoning
to students with a predominately literary training, satisfied with plausible speculation and clever writing, with no sound basis in exact information, no clear
philosophical background and no habits of consecutive thought. Certainly the
contrast between the feeling of students today and those of yesterday about a
course in the law of real property is significant. It did not seem hard to the
student of my generation, although it took up more of the curriculum than it
does now. The first year course in property in 1889-90 covered more ground
than has generally been attempted in recent years, and covered it thoroughly.
Today, the subject seems to bewilder students. The things which are simply
so and must be learned as such, and the exact logical development of propositions to reach assuredly predictable results are not congenial to the habits of
thinking and study of a generation not raised on the Latin grammar, the Greek
verb, and compulsory mathematics."

7 Holmes, "Natural Law," 32 Harv. L. R. 40 (1918).

